4.00 P.M.

debarred from claiming maintenance. Why is there such a distinction? All men are equal. So a similar provision should be made in other Acts and these Acts may kindly be amended. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons the Law Minister has elaborated why such an amendment is required and why it has been brought. Here a different subject has been incorporated.

It is stated and I quote: ...do not contain any time-limit for disposal of applications for alimony *pendente lite* or the maintenance and education of minor children. More than 670 cases are understood to be pending in various High Courts under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955." The cases pending before the High Courts are only appeals against the order of the trial courts. It is the family courts which are disposing of all the cases. So, there should be an amendment to be made in the Bill that the hundreds of cases pending in the family courts should be disposed of at the earliest.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI SURESH PACHOURI): It is 4 O' clock now and, as per the business schedule, we will now take up discussion on the Statement made by the hon. Prime Minister on 24th July, 2001, regarding the recent Summit-level talks held between India and Pakistan in Agra. Dr. Manmohan Singh.

(MR. CHAIRMAN in the chair.)

DISCUSSION ON THE STATEMENT OF PRIME MINISTER

Recent Summit-Level Talks Held Between India And Pakistan in Agra

THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION (DR. MANMOHAN SINGH): Mr. Chairman, Sir, diplomacy today is a serious discipline in most universities in the world, and a case-study method of examining the various issues has also gained prominence all over the world. I submit to you, Sir, that if one were to study the way this Summit had been conducted I am referring to the Agra Summit this would be a classic example, which would tell us, how not to conduct a summit dialogue. The Prime Minister's statement is a bland statement. It does not tell us what our objectives at Agra were and what we achieved in that. If we did not achieve what we set out to achieve, what were the reasons for it? Apart from a short

statement that the Summit failed because of the centrist approach of General Musharraf, we don't have a total analysis of what went wrong at the Summit. And we have to look at the newspapers to know about the proceedings of the National Executive meeting of the Bharatiya Janata Party, to get an idea of what exactly happened, because the Prime Minister had revealed to that National Executive meeting much more than what he has revealed in his statement.

Sir, we have, today, a major problem at our hands. And I say so, in all sincerity, that the failure of the Summit reflects an inadequate preparation; but behind this inadequate preparation is the fact that this Government has no consistent policy on Pakistan; it has no consistent policy on Jammu and Kashmir as well.

Sir, despite a good deal of white-washing and damage control measures that have been undertaken, after the results of the Summit became known, the sad truth is that the Conference failed; Pakistan walked away with the honours, and the whole exercise ended with General Musharraf being perceived, both nationally and internationally, in a more advantageous position than when he landed in our country. And, I submit to you that first, he used the invitation of our Prime Minister to crown himself as President. I was there in the United States at that time. People were highly critical of General Musharraf for having taken this extraordinary step of crowning himself as President; but our invitation gave him a degree of legitimacy which no other country was willing to provide. Secondly, Sir, he went on a highly successful publicity blitz to highlight the Kashmir issue and focus international attention on it. Thirdly, he managed to hijack the agenda of the unstructured summit, pushing our country to the back foot. Fourthly, he won the propaganda battle and provided added encouragement to the separatist and secessionist elements in Jammu and Kashmir in a manner which was not done before.

Sir, he showed himself as a master of media management, and some international analysts whose work I have seen, also came to the conclusion that India was to blame for the failure of the summit. Sir, this reality or these perceptions cannot be wished away and I hope that in conducting such meetings in the future, we will draw appropriate lessons.

What about the outcome? We have a Government which is not sure even about how to describe the outcome of the summit. The day the summit ended, the hon. Foreign Minister made a statement, and I speak

from memory, that there was no breakthrough, but there was also no breakdown, and that the caravan of peace would move on. That is what he said. The next day, we had the spokesman of the Government of India saying, "Forget about Agra. If there is to be any future dialogue, we will have to begin afresh". Then, again, we have another turnabout and we have the statement of the Prime Minister that says, and I quote, "Though we could not conclude a joint statement in Agra, we did achieve a degree of understanding. We will build on this to further increase the areas of agreement". So, in a short period of two weeks, there have been several twists and turnsabout the thinking of this Government!

Sir, before I go further, I hope that the Prime Minister will be kind enough to tell us, when he replies to this debate, what is the content of this understanding which he has been able to achieve with General Musharraf, and on which he hopes that we can build on for a further meaningful dialogue.

Sir, as I analyse what happened at this summit, I am compelled to come to the conclusion that there was no conceptual clarity why this Government had invited General Musharraf. There was inadequate preparation. There was no clarity about our minimum objectives or even adequate awareness of the limitations of unstructured meetings at the summit level. There was no agreed agenda. There was no clear thinking also about the intentions and objectives of Pakistan.

Sir, the Prime Minister and the hon. External Affairs Minister have been telling the country that they were surprised by single-minded, focussed attention that General Musharraf paid to the Kashmir issue. I am surprised at this naivety. I should be forgiven for using that expression because long before General Musharraf came here, he made it quite clear to all and sundry that he had a single point agenda and that, whether we agreed with him or not, for him Kashmir was the key issue and that progress on all other issues depended upon the progress on Jammu and Kashmir, the way he looked at it. What is more is, in several press interviews that he gave to our own leading newspapers, he reiterated this position. Further more the delegation that he brought with him gave a clear indication that he had no intention of discussing any matter other than what he considered to be the core issue, i.e. Jammu and Kashmir. Was it not enough for us to draw appropriate lessons about the intentions of the adversary we were faced with. For the Government now to come up with a statement that the Summit failed because of the single-minded focus of General Musharraf on

Kashmir, I think, Sir, is a gross under-statement of what happened. It was our total failure to anticipate; total failure to devise credible strategies and tactics to deal with this expected it was not unexpected, I deliberately say, 'expected' onslaught from General Musharraf. It was clearly a case of total lack of preparation.

Sir, this is not the first time and I say so, with great regret, that the studied application of mind and long-term thinking, that ought to constitute the under-pinning of our foreign policy has been missing in the last two or three years. We saw the Pokhran experiment launched with great fanfare -- I am not going into the merits and demerits of it. We got China trapped into it, gave rise to an unnecessary controversy with China; and then the hon. External Affairs Minister had to do a lot of explaining, a lot of firefighting, to bring the temperature in India-China relations down. We have seen a similar example, very recently, of this missile defence initiative of the U.S. Government. We were the first country to rush into embracing this doctrine, even when the staunch allies of the United States, like the European Union leave aside Russia and China kept a studied silence. Later on, I noticed, when the hon. External Affairs Minister went to Russia, he tried to modify the stand. We tried, later on, to wriggle out of this unambiguous endorsement of this. But these are instances where that studied application, that long-term thinking, that long-term under-pinning which is essential for a successful foreign policy seem to be missing from the foreign policy experiments of the present Government.

Sir, there was, as I see it, a basic confusion about our objectives when we went to the Summit. Why do we see it? For two years, this Government stated that it would never enter into any negotiations with a military dictator, with a military dictator who was heading a regime which was at the root of cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Then, there comes a 180 degree turn. Why is this 180 degree turn? It has never been explained adequately to Parliament, to public opinion at large, or, to the political parties whom the hon. Prime Minister invited from time to time. I was present at some of the meetings; reading between the lines, I got the impression that this initiative had been taken in order to placate international opinion. Beyond that, this Government had no structured design of what is it that we wanted to get out of a dialogue with Pakistan.

Sir, it is, therefore, not surprising that Pakistan got the feeling that India was tired of its involvement in Jammu and Kashmir, and that it could be pushed around. No serious attempt was made to disabuse General

Musharraf's mind of this line of thinking. Sir, I would respectfully submit that the Prime Minister, himself, probably, inadvertently also, contributed to this confusion and raised unduly high expectations. Sir, all of us read, with great interest, his musings on the New Year day, from Kumarakam. I quote from what he stated regarding the Kashmir problem: "In our search for a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem, both in its external and internal dimensions, we shall not traverse solely on the beaten track of the past. Rather, we shall be bold and innovative designers of a future architecture of peace and prosperity."

Mr. Chairman, Sir, we are yet to know about this design, of this architecture. It is nowhere to be seen. The opportunities provided by the Ramzan ceasefire and its extension were wasted. No political process was set in motion. Mr. K.C. Pant was brought in at a later stage, as an interlocutor, to interact with the cross-currents of public opinion in Jammu and Kashmir. But, shortly thereafter, his mission was aborted by the announcement--if I remember correctly--on the 23rd May of inviting General Musharraf to pay a visit to our country.

So, Sir, this convinces me that no serious thinking was done before we invited General Musharraf, as to what is it that we wanted to get out of such a summit. Sir, all over the world, it is the normal practice, when such summits are arranged, that they are preceded by briefings of informal opinion, both political opinion as well as in the media. In this particular case, nothing of that sort was there. The Prime Minister was graceful enough to invite all the political parties. In one of the meetings with Members of the Congress party, we learnt, I think, three-four days before the Summit, that the Summit didn't have even a structured agenda. On behalf of our party, we expressed our serious doubts about the conduct of a summit without a structured agenda. We were assured--I am speaking from memory and I am subject to correction. The hon. External Affairs Minister said, "We are still hopeful of a breakthrough."

Sir, it is because of this lack of adequate preparation that a hype was allowed to be built up, and we all know how that hype ended; into a deep sense of despair.

Sir, that the media management was poor is something which even the Government Spokesmen, including the hon. Prime Minister himself, have recognised now. We allowed General Musharraf to use his meetings with select editors, for political gains. We failed to brief our press as skilfully as

the Pakistani spokesmen were able to do. The result was, the day after the Summit ended, the New York Times carried a report about the failure of the Summit, drawing mostly on the Pakistani version of what happened at the Summit.

Sir, what has this Summit revealed? Both the Prime Minister and the External Affairs Minister, in the other House as well as in public, have stated that General Musharraf lacked vision and he has no understanding of diplomacy. Sir, that may be right. But, you will forgive me, Sir, if I were to say that the public perception of General Musharraf, that emerged out of this meeting is that of a single-minded, purposeful man stating his case with ruthless clarity. He stretched the limits of our endurance by flaunting his endorsement of the Hurriyat Conference. And what did we do? With the single exception of issuing the invitation to General Musharaff, Indian diplomacy showed no trace of being pro-active. It was mostly reactive. Before the invitation was issued, General Musharraf was begging to be invited for a dialogue at any level at any time, at any place. Any alert and sensitive Government would have recognised that the General was in search of legitimacy. We should have, therefore, before extending an invitation to him, effectively bargained as to the possible outcome of such a conference. I am told nothing of that sort was done if I am wrong, I would like to be corrected that no serious dialogue took place with the Government of Pakistan before inviting General Musharraf. That this thought of inviting him he came to know of it, only through the public announcements that were made.

Sir, it is, therefore, not surprising that several people have commented that no serious thinking had been done about our objectives, about our strategies for this Summit, that the invitation was born of domestic compulsions, notably I hope I am wrong because of the NDA's poor performance in State elections and the aftermath of what happened in the Tehlaka revelations. In the absence of a structured and coherent thinking, India during the Summit was always on the defensive. Musharraf who desperately needed this invitation, used it skilfully to turn the tables on us by seeking to set the Agenda, redefining the bilateral framework of negotiations to make them exclusively Kashmir-centric.

Sir, General Musharraf's meeting with the Hurriyat leaders and his public description of Pakistan sponsored terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir as indigenous freedom fighters, his condoning the loss of innocent lives and the sufferings of their families as inevitable in a freedom struggle, his

references to the events of 1971 which led to the liberation of Bangladesh, his contempt for the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration, we may not like all this, but the sad fact is all this boosted the morale of terrorists and secessionist elements in Jammu and Kashmir. All these traits of the General which were on ample display also give us an indication of the mindset of a person we are dealing with. Contrary to what the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister may say, Musharraf is not as naive or frivolous as we are making him out to be.

Certainly, Sir, we are in favour of continuing the dialogue with Pakistan to resolve all outstanding issues, even though we must agree-- and I agree here with the Prime Minister -- that this dialogue cannot make much progress if Pakistan remains committed to the single-minded pursuit of sponsoring cross-border terrorism as it is being done now. We cannot compromise on that. Nor can we waver in our commitment or in our resolve that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of our Union. Nor can we ever accept the doctrine that simply because Kashmir has a Muslim majority, Pakistan, therefore, has a right to interfere in its internal affairs, leave aside, to annexe it by force. But, Sir, if there is any lesson to be learnt from this Summit, it is that we must be better prepared. Our minimum national objectives must be spelt out with the utmost clarity, that Pakistan must not be allowed to get away with the feeling that India is tired of its involvement in Jammu and Kashmir and is about to give up.

At the same time, I sincerely believe, we must not give up the hope of reaching out to the people of Pakistan. We must carry home to them the message that Pakistan's persistence in following the logic of "Two-Nation" theory can only further derail the emergence of Pakistan as a modern, prosperous, democratic, State, committed to the welfare of the people. Sir, the late Quaid-e-Aazam Mohd. Ali Jinnah himself had recognised this in his address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11th August, 1947. Pakistan was created on the basis of the "Two-Nation" theory. But, the late Mr. Jinnah had the vision to realise that for building a prosperous, democratic Pakistan, this theory was obnoxious. I quote from what he had said in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11th August, 1947. He said, while addressing the Members, "You are free to go to your temples. You are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in the State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed; that has nothing to do with the business of the State. You will find that, in course of time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims

would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense of the term, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense, as citizens of the State." In other words, the vision that Mr. Jinnah wanted to project was a vision which would help to build a secular, democratic, Pakistan. There are forces in Pakistan which are inimical to our country. There are forces which still believe in a long period of hostility against India. But, Pakistan has also a growing middle-class, a growing number of people who recognise that we have wasted these 53 years and that we cannot allow the animosities of the past to bury our common desire for a glorious future which, undoubtedly, awaits this sub-continent, if the two major countries in the sub-continent learn to work together in their joint fight against poverty, ignorance and disease.

So, we need a two-track approach. We must convince Pakistan that its nefarious design will never be allowed to succeed. At the same time, to the people of Pakistan, we must also project a new vision of our common, shared, destiny, that if they forget the logic of "Two-Nation" theory, our two countries can look forward to a future, for which our future generations would be grateful, if we took credible steps toward reconciliation between our two countries. Sir, then, the question that arises is, where do we go from here, after the Summit. I submit that we must operate at two levels. First of all, at the international level. Today, Afghanistan has become a problem not only for us, but also for a large number of other countries, like some countries of Central Asia, China, etc. Countries like Russia are also worried. There is a group of SHANGHAI Plus Three, which is discussing, for example, the implications of Talibanisation of Afghanistan for other countries. For peace and prosperity in our region, I think, we must work in close cooperation with all these countries. And our all efforts at the international level should be to persuade the international community to bring back to Afganistan the cherished old role of a non-aligned country, a tolerant country. Whatever we can do in the international fora for this perception we should do. Today, I think, we should be a lot more active in this direction than we have been in the past. Then, Sir, I submit to the hon. Minister that he should appoint a special envoy, on a permanent basis, a roving Ambassador, who would carry home to the international community the message of what India is fighting for in Kashmir and that if we fail there, the bell tolls not only for us, but it tolls for a large number of other countries as well. I heard, the hon. Foreign Minister saying, 'Pakistan says, "Kashmir is the core issue for them", for us, Kashmir is the core of our civilization. These are very noble sentiments. But I submit to the hon. External Affairs

Minister that the ordinary people do not understand the meaning of what he is trying to convey. We, therefore, need a pro-active diplomacy. Our ambassador should interact much more intensively with the Arab countries, with countries like Saudi Arabia, with the UAE, and other countries of this region to convince them that India's fight against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism is a fight for decency, a fight for the rule of law, a fight for a new synthesis where people of diverse cultural persuasions, linguistic backgrounds can live in peace and harmony. Therefore, at the international level, we must intensify our efforts to carry conviction with the world that the so-called freedom struggle in Kashmir is essentially a naked show of cross-border terrorism.

Then, Sir, we must also recognise that we have a problem in Jammu and Kashmir, internally. Our borders are not for negotiations. We cannot allow these borders to be re-drawn in blood. We have an obligation to redress the grievances of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. We need to make a very sincere approach to redress those grievances.

Sir, the internal problem in Jammu and Kashmir has two dimensions. First, many of us had anticipated that after the failure of the Agra Summit, there would be increased incidence of insurgency. The hon. Prime Minister would recall, when he called the leaders of the Opposition to brief them on the outcome of the Summit, I had myself, specifically, raised this matter that we were worried at the failure of the Summit. It would lead to an intensification of militancy, cross-border terrorism, in Jammu and Kashmir. The hon. External Affairs Minister had, then, assured that the Government was fully in control, that they had achieved notable successes in recent months; and that they were fully equipped to meet any attempt to accelerate the tempo of insurgency. Sir, I say with great sorrow that after the ending of the Summit, so many innocent people have lost their lives. This seems to be an unending process; and, if all that the hon. Minister of External Affairs told us was in place, if all those arrangements were as effective as we were assured, then these innocent people would not have lost their lives. We are face to face with internationally sponsored terrorism, but, by now, we should have adequate intelligence network to enable us to know where these soft targets exist. We have, by now, enough experience to deal with it. That we do not seem to be coping with the situation as effectively as we should be, is a matter of deep concern. I would like the hon. Prime Minister to enlighten the House as to what exactly is being done to provide the minimum amount of security and safety that the Indian

citizens in Jammu and Kashmir need. But, Sir, beyond that, there are several other matters in which we must be a lot more pro-active than we have been in the past. In the recent years, the outflow of misguided youths from Jammu and Kashmir to join the operations of terrorists has diminished, but I have seen some photographs in the last two weeks showing some young people again being lured back. Sir, since unemployment is the root cause of all these problems, we must have a special employment oriented programme, particularly, for the youths of Jammu and Kashmir, so that these youths can earn a decent living through the normal mechanism and they don't have to join the ranks of these nefarious elements who are trying to misguide them. Sir, the administration in the State of Jammu and Kashmir needs to be toned up and this is a message that the Prime Minister should convey to the hon. Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. I have said several times in this House that both in Jammu and Kashmir and in the North-Eastern Region, the Indian nation is on a mission. These regions are vital for us not because they are pieces of territory, but because they represent the essence of Indian culture and Indian civilisation. Therefore, the best of India's civil servants should be deputed to serve in the North-East, to serve in Jammu and Kashmir, so that any administrative lapses that may exist can be plugged, without any loss of time.

Sir, we are up against a very vicious enemy. This vicious enemy still strikes; he has the advantage of surprise, but we owe it to the people of India; we owe it to ourselves that our valiant security forces who are doing a great job under very difficult conditions we shall spare no effort to see that no innocent person suffers in the process of dealing with militancy. I was deeply saddened a few days ago when I read the story of a nine-year-old innocent girl, who was on her way to school, becoming a victim of cross-fire. We need to carry conviction with the people of Jammu and Kashmir that we are a civilised State, that despite these grave provocations from Pakistan, we will not allow our society to be brutalised. And, I do believe that this is an area where we need to have respect for fundamental human rights which is a part of the ethos of Indian civilisation, and even under the gravest provocation, I think, we must not lose sight of that noble heritage of our country.

Sir, I do believe that we need a long-term development plan which would fire the imagination of the youth of Jammu and Kashmir. I know when this state of insurgency exists, it may seem academic to talk about long-term development thinking, long-term employment promotion

programme, etc. But, if we do not project such a vision, we may not be able to win the war or the battle against terrorism. The country, therefore, needs an imaginative programme for the North-East, it needs an imaginative programme for Jammu and Kashmir which would fire the imagination of youth in these regions, that India is a caring State, we are a caring civilisation, that citizens of India regardless of wherever they may be staying, they have a future, that that future is bright.

Sir, with regard to some other matters, there have been panchayat elections in Jammu and Kashmir. It is good that grass-root institutions there are being re-vitalised, and they must be strengthened in all possible ways, because that is one way in which social services can be made accountable to the people at the grass-root level. Their efficiency will increase, and in that way we will be able to involve a lot more people in the processes of governance. Improving the quality of governance, therefore, must also be one of the critical tasks of winning the war against terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Similarly, Sir, I believe that a sincere and honest dialogue must begin with all political elements. Sir, I am not the one who would say that Hurriyat is the representative of the people. But, the Prime Minister took the initiative of appointing Mr. K.C. Pant. That process must be carried forward to its logical conclusion. There must be meaningful, purposeful dialogue with all the major political elements, be they in the Kashmir valley, be they in Ladakh, be they in Jammu, to know about the aspirations of the people and what the Indian State can do to fulfil their aspirations. There have been talks about where do we begin. Do we being with 1953 or elsewhere? I do not wish to go into that. I still believe, Sir, that the Accord that Smt. Indira Gandhi entered into with the great Seikh Mohd. Abdullah still provides a viable basis of beginning the dialogue with the disaffected people, disaffected elements in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. With these words, Mr. Chairman, Sir, I thank you for giving me this time.

सूचना और प्रसारण मंत्री (श्रीमती सुषमा स्वराज) : सभापति महोदय, अभी सदन में आगरा शिखर वार्ता पर माननीय प्रधान मंत्री जी द्वारा दिए गए वक्तव्य पर चर्चा आरम्भ हुई है। नेता विपक्ष ने चर्चा आरम्भ करते हुए कुछ महत्वपूर्ण बिन्दु उठाए हैं। मैं उनमें से कुछ का उत्तर देना चाहूंगी और कुछ नए आयाम इस चर्चा में जोड़ना चाहूंगी। मैं बहुत ध्यान से सरदार मनमोहन सिंह को सुन रही थी। जिस समय वे आगरा शिखर वार्ता को एक असफल बातचीत, एक विफल वार्ता की संज्ञा दे रहे थे तो मेरे जेहन में एक सवाल उठ रहा था कि आखिर उनकी निगाह में इस वार्ता की सफलता की कसौटी क्या है। इस वार्ता के अंत में यदि संयुक्त वक्तव्य जारी हो जाता या एक संयुक्त घोषणापत्र पर हस्ताक्षर हो जाते तो क्या इस सफलता की प्राप्ति के लिए हम कुछ

भी करने को तैयार हो जाते, कुछ भी लिखने को तैयार हो जाते, कुछ भी देने को तैयार हो जाते और चूंकि हम इसके लिए तैयार नहीं हुए इसलिए असफलता का दोष हमारे सिर मंढ़ा जाएगा। उन्होंने कहा कि आपने पूर्व तैयारी नहीं की थी इसलिए संयुक्त वक्तव्य जारी नहीं हो सका, इसलिए वार्ता विफल हुई। यह गलत है सभापति जी, सरासर गलत है। कोई पूर्व तैयारी का अभाव संयुक्त वक्तव्य के आड़े नही आया। अगर संयुक्त घोषणा पत्र और संयुक्त वक्तव्य के आड़े कोई चीज आई तो केवल पाकिस्तान का वह अड़ियल रवैया जिसके अंतर्गत वे कहते रहे कि जब तक कश्मीरियों की इच्छा के अनुसार कश्मीर का समाधान नहीं होगा हम दोनों देशों के रिश्तों में किसी तरह का परिवर्तन नहीं आ सकता, किसी तरह का सुधार नहीं हो सकता। इस बात का जिक्र प्रधानमंत्री जी ने अपनी स्टेटमैंट में, अपने वक्तव्य में किया भी लेकिन आप उस पर यकीन नहीं कर रहे हैं। अगर आपको हिंदुस्तान के प्रधानमंत्री की बात पर यकीन नहीं आता तो मैं पाकिस्तान के प्रवक्ता का वक्तव्य आपको पढ़कर सुनाती हूं। जिस यूनिफोकल एप्रोच की बात हिंदुस्तान के प्रधानमंत्री ने कही और यह कहा कि इसके कारण समिट फेल हुई तो मैं पाकिस्तान के प्रवक्ता, उनके स्पोक्सपर्सन का जो बयान है उसका पैरा पढ़कर सुनाती हूं : "The Pakistan Spokesperson said, President Parvez Musharraf had made it plain to his host that no progress could be made towards normalisation of relations between the two countries, unless the issue of Kashmir was resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir." आप मुझे बताइए कि क्या इस रुख के चलते कोई संयुक्त वक्तव्य जारी हो सकता था? इस जिद के चलते किसी संयुक्त घोषणा पत्र पर हस्ताक्षर हो सकते थे या होने चाहिए थे? सभापति जी, जहां तक तैयारी का सवाल है, विदेश मंत्री जी बैठे हैं, चर्चा में भाग लेते हुए बहुत विस्तार से आपको उस सारी तैयारी का ब्यौरा देंगे जो विदेश मंत्रालय के स्तर पर हुई, प्रधानमंत्री स्तर पर हुई लेकिन इतना तो मैं भी आपको बता सकती हूं कि भारत की ओर से तैयारी में किसी तरह की कोई कसर नहीं छोड़ी गई। भारत ने उन तमाम मुद्दों की पहचान की थी जिस पर वह बात करना चाहता था। हमने एक कम्पोजिट डायलॉग, एक समग्र बातचीत का मसौदा तैयार किया था लेकिन पाकिस्तान के शासकों की इच्छा, परंपरागत तरीके से बात करने की नहीं थी। वे लीक से हटकर बात करना चाहते थे। उनकी दिलचस्पी अधिकारी स्तर की वार्ता में नहीं थी, यहां तक कि विदेश मंत्री स्तर की वार्ता में भी नहीं थी। सदरे पाकिस्तान सीधे वजीरे आजम हिंदुस्तान से बात करना चाहते थे, अकेले में बात करना चाहते थे। हमारे सामने दो ही विकल्प थे या तो बातचीत का न्यौता रद्द कर देते या बातचीत उनकी इच्छा के अनुसार करते। आज सरदार मनमोहन सिंह जी खड़े होकर कह रहे हैं कि न्यौता रद्द करने की बात थी तो आपने न्यौता दिया ही क्यों? मैं हैरान हुई उनकी बात सुनकर। उन्होंने कहा कि "You provided legitimacy to his Government" लेकिन सभापति जी, मैं आपके माध्यम से इस सदन को याद दिलाना चाहती हूं कि यही सदन था, मैं इधर बैठी थी और सामने प्रणब मुखर्जी जी बैठे थे, अंतर्राष्ट्रीय स्थिति पर चर्चा चल रही थी। विदेश मंत्री को इंगित करते हुए उन्होंने इस सरकार से कहा था कि पाकिस्तान से बातचीत करो, कैरेक्टर ऑफ गवर्नमेंट को आड़े मत आने दो। वहां कौन सी रिजीम है, कौन सी रिजीम नहीं है इसकी परवाह न करते हुए बातचीत करो। सभापति जी, इतना ही नहीं इन्होंने तो यहां तक कहा था कि क्रास बॉर्डर टेरेरिज्म को समाप्त करने की जो शर्त लगा रहे हो क्या कभी ऐसा होगा। यह शर्त हटाकर बात करो और मेरे पास 23 नवम्बर, 2000 का इसी सदन का यह बयान है। मुझे खुशी है कि प्रणब दा यहां बैठे हैं। आज आप कहते हैं कि हमने लेजिटिमेसी दे दी। सरदार

मनमोहन सिंह जी आपके बराबर में प्रणब मुखर्जी बैठे हैं मैं उनका बयान आपको पढ़कर सुनाना चाहती हूं "I feel that the Government of the day would not consider the character of the Government with which we are dealing. So far as Pakistan is concerned, from 1958 to 1971, and again from 1978 to 1988, we had to deal with military regimes, because that were only there." यह इन्होंने कहा था कि कैरेक्टर ऑफ गवर्नमेंट की परवाह मत करो, उसे छोड़कर बात करो। वहां मिलिट्री रिजीम है या कोई और रिजीम है लेकिन उनसे बात करो और जो मैंने कहा वह क्रॉस बॉर्डर टेरेरिज्म पर कहा था "We are in favour of opening the dialogue with Pakistan." और यह वे कह रहे हैं, मैं नहीं, "रिपीटीडली" ये उनका वर्ड है। "Repeatedly, not once, twice, thrice, and again, he said, repeatedly, "we are saying to the Prime Minister, and to you, Mr. Foreign Affairs Minister, that without opening a dialogue with Pakistan, we cannot resolve the issue. You convey the message to him."

Rightly, the message was conveyed. But, how can this message be understood in its proper perspective, when, in the next breath it is subjected that unless the military regime of Pakistan gives a commitment to cross-border terrorism, the dialogue will be meaningless and useless. Is it possible? He was questioning us, "Is it possible to have such a situation?" He was asking the Government, "Is it possible to have such a situation?" क्या यह संभव है कि पाकिस्तान सीमा पार आतंकवाद को बंद कर देगा और उसके बाद आप बातचीत करेंगे। क्या ऐसी स्थिति कभी आएगी? इसलिए यह शर्त मत लगाओ और बात करो, मिलेटरी रिजीम से बात करो, सीमा पार आतंकवाद की शर्त हटाओ, बात करो और आज सरदार मनमोहन सिंह जी कह रहे हैं कि न्योता ही क्यों दिया। यह बात समझ में नहीं आती सभापति जी कि..

DR. MANMOHAN SINGH : Mr. Chairman, Sir, I would like to say, I never said that you should not have invited Gen. Musharraf. I said, "Before inviting him, you should have made adequate preparations". ...(*Interruptions*)... I also said, "If you knew that Gen. Musharraf was very keen to be invited, you should have used that knowledge to bargain with him before you issued an invitation that this would be the likely outcome of the Summit." I never said, "You were wrong in inviting him".

श्रीमती सुषमा स्वराज : सभापति जी, मैं यही कह रही थी। ...(व्यवधान)... मैं यही कर रही थी। आप कह रहे हैं कि आपने उन्हें यह बता दिया होता। उन्हें बता दिया गया था। लेकिन उनकी इच्छा परम्परागत तरीके से बात करने की नहीं थी। फिर क्या करते। मैं उसके जवाब में कह रही थी कि आपने तो कहा था कि क्रास बार्डर टेरोरिज्म की शर्त भी मत लगाओ, बात करो। मिलेटरी रिजीम है तो क्या हुआ बात करो। पहले भी मिलेटरी शासकों से बात हुई है। मैं आपसे कहना चाहती हूं कि यह जरूरी नहीं है कि विपक्ष में बैठने का मतलब है कि सरकार जो कुछ करे उसके उल्टा बोलो। अगर हम न्योता नहीं देते तो यहां 23 नवम्बर को प्रणब मुखर्जी कहते हैं कि न्योता दो, मिलेटरी शासकों को न्योता दो और जब हम न्योता देते हैं तब आप कहते हैं कि आपने

न्योता दिया क्यों। चित्त भी मेरी और पट्ट भी मेरी Heads I win, Tails you lose. कम से कम यह बात राष्ट्रीय मुद्दों पर तो नहीं होनी चाहिए। सभापति जी, हमने न्योता रद्द क्यों नहीं किया, क्योंकि हमको लगा कि कोई लाभ हो या न हो कम से कम इस मुलाकात से यह लाभ होगा कि एक दूसरे की समझ बढ़ेगी, एक दूसरे की शख्सियत, एक दूसरे के व्यक्तित्व के बारे में समझ जायेंगे और यह हुआ।

श्री बालकवि बैरागी (मध्य प्रदेश) : बड़ी रिसर्च कर रहे थे।

श्रीमती सुषमा स्वराज : हां, रिसर्च ही की। जब दो व्यक्ति बातचीत करते हैं तो एक दूसरे के साइको का रिसर्च होता है, एक दूसरे के मनोविज्ञान का रिसर्च होता है। ...**(व्यवधान)**... आप तो कवि हैं, आप जानते हैं। ...**(व्यवधान)**...

श्री एस.एस. अहलुवालिया (झारखंड) : सभापति जी, यह रनिंग कमेन्टरी बंद होनी चाहिए। ...**(व्यवधान)**... इस तरह की बात कर रहे हैं। ...**(व्यवधान)**...

श्री मूल चन्द मीणा (राजस्थान) : मुद्दे पर बात करिए। ...**(व्यवधान)**...

श्रीमती सुषमा स्वराज : बैरागी जी कह रहे हैं कि रिसर्च हो रही थी। वे कवि हैं, वे जानते हैं कि जब दो व्यक्ति आमने-सामने आते हैं तो वे एक दूसरे का मनोविज्ञान समझते हैं, एक दूसरे की साइको समझते हैं। किसी भी वार्ता के सर चढ़ने से पहले यह बहुत जरूरी है कि एक दूसरे को समझा जाए। प्रणब दा ने उस दिन कहा था कि: "There is no way in which we can tackle the problem with Pakistan, except engaging in a serious dialogue. I don't expect that the dialogue would succeed immediately."

इसलिए हम सब को यह लगता था, हम सब यह कहते थे कि अगर इस पूरी वार्ता के बाद हम धन्यवाद कहकर उठ जाएं कि फिर मिलेंगे तो वार्ता सफल हुई, यह कह देते थे। इसलिए मैंने कहा कि न्यौता रद्द इसलिए नहीं किया कि कम से कम एक दूसरे की शखसियत को समझें, एक दूसरे के व्यक्तित्व को समझें और यही हुआ। भारत के प्रधानमंत्री की कूटनीतिक दक्षता, उनकी स्टेट्समैनशिप को सदरे पाकिस्तान ने पहचाना और पाकिस्तान के राष्ट्रपति को हिन्दुस्तान की जनता ने देखा, सुना और समझा। मैं यह समझती हूं कि शायद पहली मुलाकात के लिए इतनी उपलब्धि को भी काफी माना जाना चाहिये। सभापति जी, दो तीन बार डा. मनमोहन सिंह जी ने पूअर मीडिया मेनेजमेंट का सवाल उठाया। यह आरोप हम पिछले 20 दिन से सुन रहे हैं। क्योंकि संसद के दोनों सदनों में चर्चा होनी थी इसलिए इसका जवाब मैंने बाहर नही दिया। लेकिन आज सदन को विश्वास में ले कर आपके माध्यम से कुछ बहुत सीधी बातें इस बारे में मैं कहना चाहूंगी। सब से पहले तो मैं यह जानना चाहती हूं कि जब हम इस शब्द का इस्तेमाल करते हैं मीडिया मेनेजमेंट, इससे हमारा अभिप्राय क्या है? इराका वास्तविक अर्थ क्या है? अगर शाब्दिक अर्थ निकालेंगे तो बहुत डेरोगेटरी होगा। "Managing the media" is a very, very derogatory term. मुझे नहीं लगता कि मिसमेनेजमेंट या पूअर मेनेजमेंट की बात वह कर रहे हैं, वह लोग मीडिया को मेनेज करते होंगे, बिलकुल नहीं, लेकिन बहुत बार शाब्दिक अर्थ अलग होता है और प्रचलित अर्थ अलग होता है और उस शब्द का वही अर्थ जाना जाने लगता है। अगर भाव यह है कि मीडिया को हमारी तरफ से खबरें नहीं दी जा रही थी जिसको सीधे सीधे डा. मनमोहन सिंह जी ने कहा कि पाकिस्तान की तरफ से खबरें दी जाती थी और हमारे मीडिया को

5.00 P.M.

उनकी खबरों पर आश्रित रहना पड़ता था। मैं यहां बुनियादी बात कहना चाहती हूं। सभापति जी, यह एक सम्मिट थी, बंद कमरे में चल रही दो देशों की वार्ता, दो सरकारों के प्रमुख आपस में संवाद कर रहे थे। यहां न्यूज़ का कोई फास्ट फूड काऊंटर नही चल सकता था, यह कोई चुनाव विश्लेषण नहीं था जहां हर दौर की वार्ता के बाद ...(**व्यवधान**)... अगर इस तरह की टोका-टोकी बिलावजह होगी, क्या कहा मैंने? मैंने कहा कि यह चुनाव विश्लेषण नहीं था जहां हर दौर की वार्ता के बाद एक नया चित्र उभरता है और नयी सामग्री को ले कर के आगे चर्चा चलती रहती है। यह एक सम्मिट थी, दो होस्टाइल नेशंस के बीच चल रही शिखर वार्ता, जहां तर्क तो थे मगर भावनाएं भी थी, जहां इच्छा तो थी मगर विवशताएं भी थीं, जहां शान्ति की नयी कोशिश तो थी मगर युद्ध की पुरानी तलखियां भी थीं। इस तरह की वार्ता जटिल भी होती है और नाजुक भी। जटिलता और नज़ाकत के दौर में तुरत-फुरत पका कर खबरें नहीं दी जा सकती। इस तरह की वार्ता में खबरें प्राप्त करने के लिए धैर्य की बड़ी जरूरत होती है, संयम की जरुरत होती है। लेकिन जहां चौबीसों घंटों के चेनल चल रहे हों वहां धैर्य और संयम कौन रखता है। वहां तुरत-फुरत खबर चाहिये, सही नहीं तो गलत, पकी नहीं तो अधपकी, मगर यह काम हम नहीं कर सकते थे क्योंकि हम कूटनीतिक आचरण की मर्यादाओं से बंधे थे। मगर यह काम दूसरी तरफ से हो रहा था, चोरी छिपे भी और खुल कर भी। सेलेक्टेव लीकेज़ेज़ भी हो रही थी और ओपन ब्रीफिंग भी हो रही थीं। हमारी ओर से एक वक्तव्य मेरा आया और बवाल मच गया। क्या कहा था मैंने, मैं पूछना चाहती हूं क्या कहा था मैंने? अपने देश के मुद्दे गिनाए थे, स्वयं घड़ कर नहीं, कल्पना की उडान भर कर नहीं, वह मुद्दे जो वन ऑन वन मीटिंग में प्रधानमंत्री जी ने जनरल परवेज़ मुशर्रफ के साथ उठाए थे, वह मुद्दे जो शिष्ट मंडल की वार्ता में उन्हें पढ़ कर सुनाए थे, वह मुद्दे जो लिखित स्वरूप में उनके हाथ में थमाए थे। कुछ भी असत्य नहीं बोला था मैंने, कुछ भी गलत नहीं बोला था मैंने, मैं भारत की सूचना और प्रसारण मंत्री हूं, अपने देश के लिए बोलना मेरा अधिकार है। इसके लिए मुझे अलग से अधिकार की जरूरत नही है। यह अधिकार मुझे उसी दिन मिल गया था जिस दिन सूचना और प्रसारण मंत्रालय का जिम्मा मेरे प्रधानमंत्री ने मुझे सौंपा था। यह इंडो पाक सम्मिट थी लेकिन जनरल परवेज़ मुशर्रफ और उनके डेलीगेशन ने इसे कश्मीर सम्मिट में बदल दिया था। वह अपने मुल्क को सुबह से समझा रहे थे कि वह केवल और केवल कश्मीर की बात कर रहे हैं, वह चाहते थे अन्दर भी कश्मीर की बात हो और बाहर भी कश्मीर की बात हो। यह डिजाइन था उनका, यह प्लानिंग थी उनकी, यह एक सुनियोजित, सोची-समझी योजना थी उनकी। लेकिन जाने-अनजाने हमारा मीडिया उलझ गया था उसमें। इसलिए मुझे लगा कि यह भारत के हित में नहीं है। सुबह से लेकर दोपहर हो गयी थी मेरे कान पक गए थे सुनते सुनते - anchor after anchor, expert after expert, guest after guest, panellist after panellist -तब मुझे लगा कि मुझे यह जिम्मा संभालना चाहिए। मैंने सबसे पहले प्रमाणिक जानकारी हासिल की। जब मुझे पता लगा कि ये मुद्दे देश के प्रधान मंत्री ने उठाए हैं तो मैंने जिम्मेदारी से यह जिम्मा संभाला। दो मकसद थे मेरे बोलने के। पहला मकसद था कि वाकई जिन चिंताओं और जिन सरोकारों को प्रधान मंत्री ने अंदर रखा है, देशवासियों को उससे वाकिफ होना चाहिए। पता लगना चाहिए काश्मीर में निर्दोष मारे गए लोगों के परिवारों को कि सीमा पार आतंकवाद का मुद्दा उनके देश के प्रधान मंत्री ने जनरल परवेज मुशर्रफ के साथ उठाया है। पता लगना चाहिए युद्धबंदियों के उन रिश्तेदारों को जो सीने से अपने संबंधियों की तस्वीरें चिपकाकर बाहर बैठे इंतजार कर रहे थे कि उनके दुखदर्द को जुबान देने का काम प्रधान मंत्री ने सदरे

पाकिस्तान के साथ किया है। लेकिन दूसरा मकसद था मेरा कि काश्मीर से फोकस हटे। काश्मीर का फोकस भारत के हित में नहीं था। मैं चाहती थी कि मेरे वक्तव्य से संकेत लेकर, सूत्र पकड़कर हमारे एन्कर्स इन मुद्दों पर चर्चा चलाएं। चर्चा चलाएं क्रास बार्डर टेरोरिज्म की, चर्चा चलाएं पी ओ डब्ल्यूज की, चर्चा चलाएं न्यूक्लियर रिस्क रिडक्शन फैक्टर्स की, चर्चा चलाएं हमारे ट्रेड रिलेशंस की। उनके चैनल्स पर पाकिस्तानी मेहमान बैठे थे। वे उन पाकिस्तानी मेहमानों से उनकी राय जानें। उनसे ये प्रश्न पूछें ताकि पूरे देश को पता चले। लेकिन अफसोस - यह नहीं हुआ। उल्टे आलोचना मेरी होने लगी। मैं कहना चाहती हूं कि आलोचना पाकिस्तान वाले करें, समझ में आता है क्योंकि जो चक्रव्यूह उन्होंने काश्मीर के इर्द-गिर्द रच रखा था उसका भेदन हो गया था। पर आप लोगों को क्या हो गया था? मेरे देश के प्रतिपक्षी दलों को क्या हो गया था? मेरे देश के मीडिया को क्या हो गया था? अगले दिन सुबह मैंने पढ़ा - Sushma did not speak a word on Kashmir! Yes, I did not speak a word on Kashmir because there was too much of Kashmir from the other side. कह रहे हैं कि She became a spoilt spanner! उसने बातचीत में खटास डाल दी। उसके कारण बातचीत टूट गयी She did disservice to talks! एक कांग्रेस के प्रवक्ता ने कहा कि She did lopsided briefing! मैं आप लोगों से पूछना चाहती हूं। लोपसाइडेड ब्रीफिंग - जिन चीजों पर आपत्ति होनी चाहिए थी उसमें कांग्रेस प्रवक्ता ने आपत्ति नहीं की। आपकी जमीन पर खड़े होकर जनरल परवेज ने मौलाना मसूद को टेरोरिस्ट की बजाए रिलीजियस लीडर बोला। काश्मीर [redacted] उग्रवाद को जेहाद बोला। काश्मीर के आतंकवाद को स्वतंत्रता संग्राम बोला। काश्मीर में आतंकवाद की तुलना फिलिस्तीन के मुक्ति समर से की। कारगिल के युद्ध की तुलना 1971 के बंगलादेश के युद्ध से की। इन सबमें आपको कुछ आपत्तिजनक नहीं लगा, एक चीज काबिले ऐतराज नहीं लगी ...(व्यवधान)...

श्री सभापति : बैठ जाइए ...Members from the Congress Party will also speak. They can refer to that later. Now let the Minister complete her speech. ...*(Interruptions)*... Let the Minister complete it. ...*(Interruptions)*...

श्रीमती सुषमा स्वराज : इसमें एक चीज काबिले ऐतराज नहीं लगी। ऐतराज किस पर किया, कि सुषमा ने काश्मीर नहीं बोला। एक शेर है सभापति महोदय -

"वह बात सारे फसाने में जिसका जिक्र नहीं" सुन लें ...(व्यवधान)...

MR. CHAIRMAN: Please sit down. ...*(Interruptions)*... Sit down, sit down, sit down. ...*(Interruptions)*... You will also speak. You will also get a chance. ...*(Interruptions)*... Are you not interested in hearing that? ...*(Interruptions)*...

SHRI S.S. AHLUWALIA: Sir, if he is not interested, he can go out. ...*(Interruptions)*...

श्री बालकवि बैरागी : वे कह रहे हैं कि नहीं सुनना हो तो बाहर चले जाइए ...(व्यवधान)... यह ठीक नहीं है ...(व्यवधान)...

श्री रामचन्द्र खूंटिआ (उड़ीसा) : आप कौन होते हैं बोलने वाले ...(व्यवधान)...

श्री सभापति : बैठिए ...(व्यवधान)... अहलुवालिया जी, आप बैठिए। आप बैठ जाइये। ...(व्यवधान)... There are many more speakers from the Congress party. ...*(Interruptions)*... They will speak. ...*(Interruptions)*... The speakers from the Congress party can refer to them. ...*(Interruptions)*...

श्री रवि शंकर प्रसाद (बिहार) : हिन्दुस्तान टेबल पर नहीं जा रहा है ...(व्यवधान)...

श्री रामचन्द्र खूंटिआ : *...(व्यवधान)...

MR. CHAIRMAN: Nothing will go on record. ...*(Interruptions)*...Nothing will go on record. ...*(Interruptions)*...

DR. MANMOHAN SINGH: Sir, I am very sorry...*(Interruptions)*...

श्री सभापति : अब वह बैठ गए, आप भी बैठ जाइये। ...(व्यवधान)...

DR. MANMOHAN SINGH: Sir, I am very sorry that a Member from our party used that expression. I wish it had not been used. I am very sorry. I wish that expression had not been used.

श्रीमती सुषमा स्वराज : आप एक्सपंज कर दीजिए, सभापति जी, ये शब्द न शालीन हैं और न शोभादायक हैं। ...(व्यवधान)...

MR. CHAIRMAN: I will expunge it.

श्रीमती सुषमा स्वराज : सदन का माहौल थोड़ा गर्म हो गया है, मैं एक शेर सुनाकर उसको थोड़ा हल्का करूंगी, क्योंकि इतना कुछ बोला गया, उस पर आपत्ति नहीं और मैंने एक शब्द नहीं बोला, उस पर आपत्ति है। तो मुझे एक शेर याद आ गया। आप तो खुद शेर-ओ-शायरी के बहुत शौकीन हैं।

"वो बात सारे फसाने में जिसका जिक्र नहीं,
वो बात उन्हें बहुत नागवार गुजरी है।

सभापति जी, मुझे किसी की नागवारी की परवाह नहीं है, बल्कि मुझे संतोष इस बात का है कि मैंने अपने देश की बात अपने देशवासियों के सामने रखकर अपनी जिम्मेदारी का निर्वाह किया है। जहां तक प्रोपरायटीज़ का सवाल है, दूसरी तरफ से पग-पग पर प्रोपरायटीज़ का उल्लंघन हो रहा था, मगर किसी ने नोटिस नहीं लिया। मुझे प्रोपरायटी का पाठ बहुत पढ़ाया गया है। सभापति जी, मैं पूछना चाहती हूं, सरदार मनमोहन सिंह जी यहां बैठे हैं, कूटनीतिक जगत से इनका रिश्ता रहा है, क्या डिप्लोमैटिक वर्ल्ड में, क्या कूटनीतिक जगत में आज तक यह हुआ है कि किसी मुल्क का राष्ट्रपति दूसरे मुल्क की धरती पर आकर वहां के मिनिस्टर के स्टेटमेंट का हवाला देकर कमेंट करे? यह आगरा में हुआ। क्या यह हुआ है कि किसी देश का राष्ट्रपति दूसरे

* Expunged as ordered by the chair.

देश की धरती पर खड़े होकर, वहां की एक महिला पत्रकार को वोमैन कहकर मुखातिब करे? यह आगरा में हुआ। क्या प्रोवोकेशन थी? क्योंकि उस बेचारी महिला पत्रकार ने किसी से एक सवाल उन्हें मैन कह करके, मैन एड्रेस करके पूछा था, इसलिए दो बार उसे वोमैन कह कर उन्होंने उसका हिसाब चुकता किया। लेकिन एक शब्द प्रतिवाद का किसी के मुंह से नहीं निकला। जो जी में आया बोल कर, वह हमें फ्रीडम ऑफ़ प्रैस का पाठ पढ़ा कर पाकिस्तान चले गए। वहां जा कर बोले कि गलती क्या है, आयेंगे जब हिन्दुस्तान के वजीरे आजम तो मैं अपनी पूरी प्रैस को उनके सामने बैठाऊंगा और कहूंगा कि इनसे बातचीत करिए। वह जरूर बैठायेंगे, वायदे के पक्के हैं, जरूर बैठायेंगे, लेकिन देखने की बात यह है कि उनमें से कितने लोग अगले दिन चीफ रिपोर्टर से सब-एडीटर बन करके अपने घरों में बैठ जायेंगे। डेस्क भर जायेंगे, ब्यूरोज़ खाली हो जायेंगे। एक बेचारा नवा-ए-वक्त का चीफ रिपोर्टर मसूद मलिक एक सवाल पूछने का गुनाहगार हो गया। यह है फ्रीडम ऑफ़ प्रैस कि अगले ही दिन, 24 घंटे के अंदर, उसको चीफ रिपोर्टर से सब-एडीटर बना कर बैठा दिया गया। चलिए, प्रेसीडेंट की बात मैं नहीं करती। वह तो पाकिस्तान के सर्वशक्ति सम्पन्न व्यक्ति हैं, लेकिन पाकिस्तान के प्रवक्ता, एक मामूली सरकारी अधिकारी आपकी सरज़मीन पर खड़े होकर इनविज़िबल हैंड का आरोप लगा कर चले गए। किसी के मुंह से प्रतिवाद का एक शब्द नहीं निकला। उल्टे उनके वाक्य को सत्यवादी हरीश चन्द्र का वाक्य मानकर सब इनविज़िबल हैंड ढूंढने में लग गए। वह अदृश्य हाथ कौन सा है? किसी को कोई हाथ नज़र आ रहा था और किसी को कोई हाथ नज़र आ रहा था। मेरे लिए तो मुझे हैरानी हुई कि मेरे आदाब का अंदाज़ भी कुछ लोगों को इंप्रोपर लगा। मैं हैरान हूं सभापति जी, 'आदाब' क्या पाकिस्तानी पेटेंट है? अरे यह तो मेरे मुल्क की तहजीब का हिस्सा है। गंगा-जमुनी तहजीब का हिस्सा है। उन के देश की उपज नहीं है। यहीं से गया है वह आदाब और मेरी तो आदत है, मैं अहलुवालिया जी से मिलती हूं तो उन्हें कहती हूं 'सत श्री अकाल भाजी, मैं मौलाना आज़मी साहब को मिलती हूं तो कहती हूं आदाब भाई जान, मैं विरूम्भी जी को मिलती हूं तो कहती हूं वणक्कम, कोंडैया जी से बात करती हूं तो कहती हूं हेगिदीरी और गलियारे में जब नीलोत्पल बसु से मिलती हूं तो कहती हूं कामरेड, लाल सलाम। सभापति जी, लाल सलाम कहने पर मैं वामपंथी नहीं हो जाती। झुककर आदाब करने से मेरा धर्म परिवर्तन नहीं हो गया, लेकिन कुछ लोगों को यह भी अखरा है और उस की भी चर्चा हुई, उस की भी टिप्पणियां छपीं।

अभी यहां सरदार मनमोहन सिंह बात कर रहे थे 'आउट कम' की जोकि क्रक्स है इस बात का। वह कहते हैं 'आउट कम' क्या हुआ, हासिल क्या हुआ? सभापति जी, कांग्रेस के प्रवक्ता ने हासिल होने पर, आउट कम पर कहा कि हम ने तो ब्लेंक चैक दिया था इन्हें और इन्होंने ह्यूज ओवरड्राफ्ट वापिस कर दिया। सभापति जी, मुझे समझ नहीं आता उन्हें कौन सा ह्यूज ओवरड्राफ्ट दिखाई दे रहा है। सभापति जी, बहुत बार, बहुत भारी-भरकम शब्दों में प्रतिक्रिया करने की लालसा में आदमी इररेलेवेंट बोल जाता है, अप्रासंगिक बोल जाता है। मैं पूछना चाहती हूं कौन सा ह्यूज ओवर ड्राफ्ट वापिस किया हम ने? ताशकंद और शिमला समझौते की तरह जीती हुई जमीनें समझौतों की टेबिल पर लौटाई नहीं हम ने। एक गज जमीन का भी समझौता नहीं किया हम ने। एक इंच अपनी स्थिति से टस-से-मस नहीं हुए, ओवरड्राफ्ट नहीं लौटाया। सच बात यह है कि आप ने ब्लेंक चैक दिया था और आप के चैक का, विश्वास का सम्मान करते हुए पूरे-का-पूरा फिक्स्ड डिपॉजिट हम ने आप को वापिस किया है।

मैंने कांग्रेस अध्यक्षा का बयान पढ़ा जो उन्होंने संसदीय दल की मीटिंग में बोलते हुए दिया कि "The Government lost the focus." हम फोकस से हट गए, सरासर गलत है। अगर हम फोकस से हट जाते, सरदार मनमोहन सिंह जी तो जरूर संयुक्त वक्तव्य जारी हो जाता, जरूर संयुक्त घोषणा पत्र पर हस्ताक्षर हो जाते, लेकिन भारत के प्रधान मंत्री ने कहा कि वह ड्राफ्ट जिस में सेंट्रलिटी ऑफ काश्मीर तो होगी पर क्रूअलिटी इन काश्मीर नहीं होगी, हमारे देश को मान्य नहीं है। सभापति जी, इस वार्ता का फोकस क्या था? इस वार्ता का फोकस था 'स्टेटस ऑफ काश्मीर' और मैं आप से कहना चाहूंगी जिस समय प्रधान मंत्री यह बात कह रहे थे कि हम तमाम मुद्दों पर बातचीत करने को तैयार हैं समेत जम्मू एंड काश्मीर के, उस समय भी यह स्पष्टता हमारे दिमाग में थी, यह क्लिअरिटी हमारे दिमाग में थी कि We will talk only about the situation in Kashmir and not the status of Kashmir.जहां तक स्टेटस ऑफ काश्मीर का ताल्लुक है, स्टेटस जग-जाहिर है कि काश्मीर भारत का अटूट अंग है और यह बात उन्होंने वहां अपनी प्रेस कांफरेंस में कही 'क्या काश्मीर भारत का अटूट अंग है?' अगर उन्हें अटूट शब्द अच्छा नहीं लगता तो हम कहते हैं कि काश्मीर भारत का अभिन्न अंग है। अगर अभिन्न अंग भी पसंद नहीं तो हम कहेंगे कि काश्मीर भारत का अविभाज्य अंग है और अगर हिंदी में समझ नहीं आता तो हम कहेंगे कि Kashmir is an integral part of India.

मौलाना ओबैदुल्ला खान आज़मी (झारखंड) : उर्दू में समझाइए न, काश्मीर भारत का एक हिस्सा है।

श्रीमती सुषमा स्वराज : केवल हिस्सा नहीं है, अटूट हिस्सा है। उर्दू वाले समझते हैं और मैं तो आप से कहना चाहूंगी कि प्रधान मंत्री जी ने एक कदम आगे आकर यह कहा कि उन के लिए काश्मीर जमीन का टुकड़ा है, हमारे लिए जिंदगी का हिस्सा है। उस के बाद भी कोई बात बकाया रह जाती है? और यह स्टेटस सुषमा स्वराज या प्रधान मंत्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी ने तय नहीं किया है। यह स्टेटस भारत की संसद ने तय कर के दिया है। किसी भी एक व्यक्ति को, किसी भी एक राजनीतिक दल को यह स्टेटस हटाने का अख्तियार हासिल नहीं है। यह स्टेटस है, इसलिए फोकस से हटने का सवाल कहां पैदा होता है। आप ने लोक सभा के भाषण सुने होंगे। चाहे कोई उत्तर से बोला हो, चाहे सुदूर पूर्वोत्तर से, चाहे पश्चिम से बोला चाहे सुदूर दक्षिण से, सारी बातों पर मत-भिन्नता होते हुए भी एक बात पर सब ने सहमति प्रकट की कि काश्मीर भारत का अटूट अंग है। यह है फोकस और मुझे खुशी है कि फ़ोकस से न हम हटे हैं और फोकस से न देश हटा है। इस देश के सौ करोड़ लोग सुर-में सुर मिलाकर कह रहे हैं 'काश्मीर भारत का अटूट अंग है, काश्मीर भारत का अभिन्न अंग है।'

फिर आप बात करते हैं उपलब्धि की। इस से बड़ी उपलब्धि क्या हो सकती है सरदार मनमोहन सिंह जी कि भारत इस समय विन-विन की सिचुएशन में है। उन्हें वार्ता के लिए बुलाकर हम ने यह साबित कर दिया कि हम शांति प्रक्रिया में बाधक नहीं बनेंगे, अगर जरूरत पड़ेगी तो पहल करेंगे। लेकिन बिना कुछ दिए वापिस लौटाकर हम ने यह साबित कर दिया कि हम किसी भी कीमत पर अपने राष्ट्रीय हितों से समझौता नहीं करेंगे। इस से बेहतर और क्या हासिल करना चाहते हैं आप? सच तो यह है, सभापति जी, कि भारत के प्रधान मंत्री ने अपने आचरण से कूटनीति की पाठ्य-पुस्तक में एक नया अध्याय जोड़ा है। He has created a new chapter in the textbook of diplomatic behaviour, जिसका शीर्षक है polite language, tough message, 'भाषा मधुर, संदेश कठोर'। जनरल परवेज़ मुशर्रफ साहब

ज़बान से जितना चाहे बोलकर चले गए हों लेकिन लौटना उन्हें खाली हाथ ही पड़ा, लेकिन भारत के प्रधान मंत्री ने भाषा का संयम और आचरण की गरिमा बरकरार रखते हुए यह संदेश दे दिया कि मौन वाणी से ज्यादा मुखर होता है। यही है इस वार्ता की सफलता, सभापति जी, यही है इस वार्ता की सार्थकता। धन्यवाद।

MR. CHAIRMAN: Shri S. Ramachandran Pillai...

SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE (West Bengal) : Sir, I would like to clarify certain things, as Sushmaji has referred to certain remarks that I had made. I am not a person who disowns his statements spoken from that side, when he comes to this side of the House. And, she has very correctly reported me; but she has completely misplaced the background. Sir, you would recollect, and the representatives of the Government would recollect, that, after the Kargil War, there were two slogans, two demands, of the Government representatives, including the Ministers, that Pakistan must say that they would stop aiding and abetting cross-border terrorism. In my observation, which you have quoted, I said that no country would ever say, "I have stopped aiding and abetting cross-border terrorism. Now, you come to the negotiating table." This is No.1. No.2 is the character of the Government. One of your Cabinet Ministers said, "If there was a democratic Government, then it would have been easier for us to handle the situation. I mentioned, in that context, that in Pakistan, you cannot expect that. I said this very rightly because, during 1958-71 and 1978-88, we had to deal with military regimes. Sushmaji, you have made a comment that you have created an excellent chapter in the history of diplomacy. But, unfortunately, you missed the very word which the Leader of the Opposition used when he raised the word 'legitimacy'. He did not mean 'recognition'; he meant, legitimacy to the assumption of the office of the Presidentship of Pakistan. You said that you had criticised this attempt of Pervez Musharraf, appointing himself as the President of Pakistan. So, you said that you criticised it. And, many people thought that the process of democratisation had stopped there. But, by this exercise, India is one of the countries which has welcomed it; it has accepted it and has recognised it. It is not the recognition of the country; it is not the recognition of the regime. It is the recognition of the office which he holds, which he gave himself, without any constitutional process in that country. Dr. Manmohan Singh talked of legitimisation in that context. You should have understood it. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, Sir, I understand why this Summit failed. If there are Spokespersons like Sushmaji in the Government of India, I can assure you that there will be no success of any summit.

SHRI S. RAMACHANDRAN PILLAI (Kerala): Mr. Chairman, Sir, my party, the Communist Party of India (Marxists), welcomed the summit. We consider that the process of dialogue alone can bring peace and permanent settlement of the outstanding issues between India and Pakistan. Sir, the issues are complex and complicated. It is also a fact that many of the issues are longstanding issues. It is also a fact...

MR. CHAIRMAN: Hon. Members, it is 5.23 now. We will have to sit longer till 6 O' clock, 7 O' clock so that Members can...

SHRI NILOTPAL BASU (West Bengal) : Sir, we decided to sit up to six.

MR. CHAIRMAN: All right. Then, tomorrow also you will have to sit longer because, as decided, the Prime Minister will reply to the debate on Friday at 12 o'clock. So, it should be finished before that. That is what you agreed. ...(*Interruptions*)... The reply is on Friday at 12 O'clock.

SHRI S. RAMACHANDRAN PILLAI: Sir, it was also a fact that the attitude of Pakistan was unifocal. It was also a fact that Pakistan took an intransigent attitude. But the question is whether the Government of India have made enough preparations and formulated a well-thought out strategy and tactics in the entire negotiations. Sir, that also contributed to the breakdown of the Agra Summit. There is a view now raised by certain sections, who are in the NDA, as to why should we continue to have this dialogue because, Pakistan considers what is going on in Jammu and Kashmir is a liberation struggle; that India considers Kashmir is an integral part of India; then, what is the need of these negotiations? And what Pakistan really says is, "Kashmir is the core issue. All issues are related to Kashmir. If there is no agreement on Kashmir, why should we discuss other issues?"

We should continue to discuss all issues. Of course, many issues are there. Kashmir is one of the major issues. The issue of cross-border terrorism is there. Now, India and Pakistan have become nuclear powers. The issue of cultural relations is there. The issue of trade is there. We should discuss all these issues and if we can make some achievement on some of these issues, that will create a conducive atmosphere for finding solutions to the substantive issues. We know the history of other discussions. The Vietnamese and the American discussion went on for years together. We also know the Palestinian issue. This is continuing. So, we should continue the process of dialogue. And this process of

dialogue alone can find a peaceful and permanent solution to the outstanding issues between India and Pakistan.

Sir, the Kashmir issue is a multi-dimensional issue. We should take a multi-track approach to this multidimensional issue. We should discuss with Pakistan. We should discuss with the mainstream political parties of Kashmir; we should discuss with the political parties in India and we should try to come to solution of the outstanding problems between India and Pakistan.

I would like to know from the side of the Government of India whether the Government of India have discussed and evolved a well-thought out strategy and approach with regard to all these issues. What is the perspective of the Government with regard to how to find a solution to this problem? What is the bottomline of the Government with regard to these issues? I don't think that the Government have a well-thought out strategy and a clear-cut perspective on how to find a solution to the entire problem.

Sir, if you look at some of the omissions and commissions of the Government, it shows that the Government do not have a consistent policy. The Government is led by *ad hocism;* the Government is led by casualness. Some of these omissions and commissions also show that there is inconsistency in the whole approach of the Government. If the Government of India had a common approach on all these issues, certainly, India would have attained more gains at the Agra Summit.

Sir, according to us, the most important issue in all these complex and complicated problems is to win over the minds of the Kashmiri people. We all know that it is the Kashmiri people in 1947 who fought against the intruders, instigated by Pakistan. It is the very same Kashmiri people who fought against the "Two-Nation" theory, based on religion. Sir, it is a fact that a section of them got alienated. How to win over them? If you can win over them, no force on earth can do any harm to India. So, what is the attitude of the Government of India with regard to this? I want to know whether the Government of India have any clear-cut perspective as to how to win over them. I don't think, the Government of India have such an approach. If we look at some of the acts of the Government of India, we see a lot of inconsistencies; we see a lot of contradictions; we also see that some of them are working at cross purposes.

Sir, the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly passed a Resolution asking for autonomy. We may agree or disagree with some of

those points. But, what was the attitude of the Government of India? The Government of India summarily rejected it. Not only the Government of India summarily rejected the Autonomy Resolution; it also expressed its willingness to discuss with the *Hurriyat*. What is the attitude of the *Hurriyat* on many of these issues? Now, it seems that Shri K.C. Pant is discussing that with many of the *Hurriyat* leaders. What is the attitude of the *Hurriyat*? One section of the *Hurriyat* stands for an independent Kashmir. Another section of the *Hurriyat* stands for going with Pakistan. So, we did not discuss it with the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly, the National Conference and other mainstream political parties, but we expressed our willingness to discuss it with the *Hurriyat*. Whom are we going to strengthen? Are we going to strengthen the forces which consider that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India? No. On the other hand, we are trying to strengthen the forces which are asking for an independent Kashmir, and also for joining with Pakistan.

Sir, this very same attitude the Pakistan High Commissioner also took. They did not invite the National Conference and representatives of the mainstream political parties from Jammu and Kashmir. They only invited the *Hurriyat*. We cannot blame them. The same attitude was taken by the Government of India with regard to autonomy resolution and they held discussions only with the *Hurriyat*. So, without strengthening the mainstream political parties -- whatever may be their opinion, they all consider that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India -- how can you go about? We should try to strengthen them. Without strengthening them, we cannot win over the minds of the Kashmiri people. That is one of the most important aspects. But the Government of India do not have a clear-cut perspective. They speak in different voices. We know what was the earlier stand of the main component of the NDA. I don't know their present stand, but now they are not speaking about those things. Some of the components of the NDA are not at all for having any dialogue with Pakistan. In such a situation, how can you engage in a purposeful dialogue? All these reasons led to the breakdown of the Agra Summit.

Sir, there is also another talk going on, the talk of trifurcation, on the basis of religion. We know who is behind this Jammu and Kashmir National Front. Who is the main force behind that? Why is the Government not coming out that it is opposed to it? We know that some of them who are in the United States of America want to divide; they want to take away a part of India. So, this idea of trifurcation is, in a way, helping the forces

which are trying to divide India. Let us look at the process of the ceasefire or non-initiation of combat operation. The Government made a unilateral declaration in November, 2000. What is the aim of the Government when it declared a ceasefire? Merely by declaring a ceasefire, you can't bring peace. You can't find a solution to any of the problems. You should have followed it up with proper steps. The Government did not do any of these things.

Shri K.C. Pant was entrusted with this work only in April. It seems so from a letter he has sent to us. There was no discussion with any of the parties before that. The Government is not explaining that it discussed this with any of the forces. The Government, unilaterally, announced a ceasefire. There were disagreements within the NDA later, and, hence, they called us. We discussed the matter. Afterwards, the Government decided to extend the ceasefire. Again, the Government took a decision not to extend the ceasefire. All of a sudden, the Government decided to extend an invitation to the President of Pakistan. Nobody was consulted. In the first place, when the ceasefire was announced, nobody was consulted; when there was some difference of opinion within the NDA, they called us. What was the purpose of the Government?

(THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN in the chair)

Madam, what was expected of the Government when it invited the President of Pakistan? Was it just an attempt to put the Pakistan diplomacy on test? Pakistan accepted the invitation. It was so clear, Madam, that Pakistan was not at all ready to fix the agenda. Pakistan was not at all ready to engage itself in any discussion before. They said that they would discuss any of the issues at the time of the Summit. It seems, the Government of India proceeded on the wrong assumption that the Pakistan President can't return empty handed to Pakistan. That was the reason why the Government allowed this entire media hype.

An impression was created that something was going to emerge out of the Summit. There was another impression being created--issue of a joint document after the Summit. Madam, it is not mismanagement of the media, which is the main issue. The main issue is, the Government of India had no clear-cut perception. They didn't have a collective understanding on how to approach the entire issue. That caused the breakdown of the Agra Summit.

Madam, the External Affairs Minister, immediately after the Summit, issued a statement about the happenings at the Agra Summit. In that statement, he made two important assertions. One assertion was, that the Government of India didn't believe in public relations. The statement said, "As a matter of responsible democracy, we negotiate to improve bilateral relations with our neighbours, not to indulge in public relations." We do not agree with that. In the present world, it is the most important thing to reach out to the people of Pakistan, to reach out to the international community and to mobilise the Indian public opinion. But the Government of India says that that they do not want to reach out to the people. There is also another assertion in that statement, which says, "Keeping in view the confidentiality, we did not go to the Press." There is an implied hint about the Press statement made by the President of Pakistan. We do not agree with this assertion also. It was the Information and Broadcasting Minister who went to the Press and explained the issues that were discussed in the Agra Summit. She did deliberately exclude the name of Kashmir. Now the position of the Government is that she was instructed by the Government. Why was she instructed by the Government to exclude Kashmir? Instead of explaining all issues discussed there, why did she from the Indian side exclude the name of Kashmir in the Press briefings? Actually, this gave a handle to the President of Pakistan to justify his stand. It is not mismanagement but it is the lack of perception on the part of the Government of India, lack of the collective understanding on the part of the Government of India that led to this present situation. Not only that, Madam. After the Summit, of course, there was a statement by the distinguished External Affairs Minister which stated, "We will pick up threads from the Agra Summit and go to other negotiations." But what was the statement issued by the spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs? She did not refer to Agra. She referred only to Simla and Lahore. A lot of confusion was created. The next day, the spokesperson again issued a statement. What was the reason for this change in the statement of the Ministry of External Affairs? They said that there were only written agreements in Simla and Lahore and that was why they referred to Simla and Lahore. Madam, a lot of confusion is there in the mind of the Central Government. They do not have any clear perspective of the whole approach and on how to approach the whole issue. That is why at every stage we find differences, conflicts and contradiction. This has created the present breakdown of the Agra Summit. Madam, our approach should be of course, Pakistan took a stubborn attitude a reasonable approach and it

should appear that we are taking a reasonable approach. We are for a genuine solution of the outstanding issues and we stand for friendship between the two countries. We want that friendship between these two countries strengthens. The message that should go to the entire international community is this. Now, a lot of discussion is going on with regard to the structured agenda. We know before the Summit, it was not possible because of the stand taken by the President of Pakistan. Even during the course of the Summit, it was not possible to have an agreed document. Certainly, we should continue our discussions and try to evolve a structured agenda. We are even ready to come to some agreement on a structured agenda. If a new summit is required, certainly, a new summit is required because dialogue alone can find a solution. Dialogue alone can bring peace. Dialogue alone can strengthen the friendship of India and Pakistan. We should also take sufficient steps to protect the innocent Kashmiri people because, now, the militants have started attacking the civilian people and many have died. So, the Government of India should show more vigilance to curb the attacks on innocents in Jammu and Kashmir. With these words, I conclude. Thank you.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Have we decided to sit till 6 O' clock?

SOME HON. MEMBERS: Yes, Madam.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Okay. Now, Dr. Karan Singh.

DR. KARAN SINGH (Delhi): Madam Deputy Chairperson, we are meeting here today to discuss a matter of very grave significance and importance. Therefore, I think, it is essential that we keep before ourselves the gravity and the significance of the event. The Statesman like opening remarks made by my colleague, Dr. Manmohan Singh, set the tone. But, I am sorry, subsequently, there were some attempts made to score polemical points. But, what I will do, Madam, is, I will not go into the other aspects of Jammu and Kashmir. Those are very complex whether it is the internal problem, whether it is autonomy or whether it is the law and order situation. We are discussing today the Agra Summit. An opportunity will come when we can discuss other matters pertaining to Jammu and Kashmir. I would, rather, like to focus my remarks on the Agra Summit.

And, before I do that, I would like to point out that we have got to look, briefly, into the history of Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, I do not say that I am the history I have been associated with the history of Jammu and Kashmir long before we became independent. I remember the State, as it

was during the British times before August 15, 1947. I remember the brief period between August, 1947 and October 27, 1947, when the State was technically independent. I remember the tribal invasion. The point I am making is, ever since independence, Pakistan has made one attempt after the other to break Kashmir away from India. I have been a witness to that. I was there when the tribal invasion took place. I was there when the Mahura Power House fell into the hands of the raiders and the whole of Kashmir plunged into darkness. That resulted then in a war, which took place during the whole of the next fourteen months, culminating on 1st January, 1949 in the ceasefire agreement was brokered by the U.N. The second attempt was in 1965 when I was the Sadar-i-Riyasat, when the infiltrators were sent. President Ayub Khan was ruling in Pakistan then and Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri was our Prime Minister. That, once again, resulted in a war and that war, ultimately, resulted in the Tashkent Agreement, brokered by the Soviet Union. I do remember the 1971 Bangladesh war when there was, again, fighting in Jammu and Kashmir, and now, from 1989 November, down to the present day, there is present an element of militancy and an entire plan is based on poisoning the minds of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and, somehow or the other, breaking them away from India. And this also included the misadventure in Kargil, as a result of which, so many precious lives were lost. Madam, the point I am making is that, because of this historical background, it was very clear to us that the Agra Summit would also willy nilly fail. He will try and concentrate on Jammu & Kashmir. There have been so many twists and turns in the Government's policy. The Government first said, "We will not talk to him because he is a military dictator." After that, they said, "We will not talk until the cross-border terrorism stops." Then, finally, they extended the invitation. Our party welcomed the invitation because we have always been in favour of a dialogue, we have always been in favour of a sane and civilized manner of tackling disputes.

But, for General Musharraf, that invitation came as a *vardan*. जरनल साहब तो तांउम्र मशकूर रहेंगे वाजपेयी जी के, क्योंकि उनका यहां सिर्फ स्वागत नहीं हुआ उनका तो यहां राजतिलक हुआ। पहली बात जो मुशर्रफ साहब ने यह किया कि वहां जो बेचारे प्रेजीडेंट थे, क्या नाम था उनका, किसी को याद होगा, उन्हें निकाला कि तुम घर जाओ, खुद प्रेजीडेंट बने। उसके बाद बाकायदा बड़ी खुशी से आए। ठीक है मेहमाननवाजी का तकाजा है, हम मेहमानों की इज्जत करते हैं लेकिन जिस तरीके से उनका यहां राजतिलक हुआ, जिस तरीके से उन्होंने अपनी धाक यहां जमाई, यह बात हमें याद रखनी है कि what we have, really, done is not only to fully legitimised General Musharraf, but to empower him, as far as his own country and the rest of the world is concerned. This is a point

which is not often mentioned. It is not that we did not want to invite Musharraf. But he was desperate to come any time, anywhere, to any place. And, then, ultimately, when the meeting takes place, he becomes the talk of the world, and we, as a people, cut a sorry figure.

It was handled badly. My esteemed friend, Jaswantji, is not in the House. Maybe, he is listening on the television. I have high regard for him. But I would say that it was badly handled. Let me give you two or three examples, Sir, first of all, we announced that the DGMO would visit Islamabad. I would like the Government to respond to this. The Director General of Military Operations is a senior military officer. We announced unilaterally, "The DGMO will visit Islamabad tomorrow." The next day, a message comes from Islamabad that he need not come. Let him come after the Summit. Is this any way to conduct diplomacy? Is this not getting ourselves into a position where we are shown down, where we are humiliated? The DGMO is not a peon whom you can send anywhere you like. How can you make an announcement like that, without first clearing it with Pakistan? Then, you take the question of *Hurriyat*. You made a big song and dance about the *Hurriyat*. उन्हें बुलाना नहीं चाहिए, उनसे मिलना नहीं चाहिए। या तो हिम्मत होती, आप कहते कि ठीक है हिंदुस्तान एक आजाद मुल्क है जिससे मिलेंगे, मिलें या अगर आप नहीं चाहते थे तो उन्हें बंद करते, कहते कश्मीर से आप नहीं आ सकते, नहीं मिल सकते। लेकिन यह क्या बात हुई कि आप कहते भी रहे कि नहीं मिलना चाहिए, नहीं बुलाना चाहिए फिर भी वे आए, बुलाए गए और मिले भी। क्या इज्जत रही साहब हमारी? I am just giving an example of the amateurish manner in which these sort of important matters were handled.

There is media management. आज पता नहीं क्या बात थी कि बहिन सुषमा जी बड़े गुस्से में थीं। उन्हें या तो पश्चाताप हो रहा था कि उन्होंने बीच में जो बोला उसकी पूरी कद्र नहीं हुई या उनकी लियाकत के बारे में कुछ लोगों को शंका हो गई। बहिन जी बड़ी योग्य स्त्री हैं और अच्छा बोलती हैं। या तो मैडम यह होता कि शुरू से सुषमा जी को वहां लाया जाता और कहा जाता कि आप मीडिया को समझाएं। यह हो सकता है, होना चाहिए। बहुत इम्पोर्टेंट समिट थी इसलिए कोई अधिकृत व्यक्ति होना चाहिए था जो मीडिया के साथ बात करे लेकिन बीच में सुषमा जी आईं, बोलीं हालांकि कोई ऐसी बुरी बात नहीं बोलीं, अच्छा बोलीं, मैं सुन रहा था। आपने सिर्फ यह कहा कि हमारे जम्मू-कश्मीर पर आप बोलना भूल गए बाकी सब याद रहा ...**(व्यवधान)**...

श्री टी.एन.चतुर्वेदी : उसका बचाव किया।

डा. कर्ण सिंह : अगर इन्हें अधिकृत किया जाता, She was the Minister of Information and Broadcasting. She could have been put in charge. 'Managing the media' is not derogatory. We are not talking about bribing

the media or paying the media. What we mean by managing the media is that you have somebody of sufficient stature, of sufficient ability, who will constantly interact with the media. For 48 hours, everybody remained behind parda, except Sushmaji, सुषमा जी पर्दे के बाहर आइं, बाकी तो पर्दे में चले गए। प्रधानमंत्री जी, विदेश मंत्री जी, वित्त मंत्री जी और अन्य सारे के सारे मंत्री गायब रहे और 48 घंटों के लिए जनरल मुशर्रफ को आपने बिल्कुल खुली छूट दी। यह आजाद देश है लेकिन आप कम से कम कुछ तो करते, कुछ तो ऐतराज किया होता। मैंने भी देखा। जो भी पैनल बोल रहा था वह महज जम्मू और कश्मीर की बात कर रहा था। आपको पैनलिस्ट भेजने चाहिए थे जो न्यूक्लियर रिस्क रिडक्शन की बात करते, जो टैरोरिज्म की बात करते, एकानामिक डेवलपमेंट की बात करते। आपने किया ही कुछ नहीं। फिर आप नाराज हो रही हैं। उसके ऊपर ब्रेक-फास्ट की मीटिंग। मैं एक बात पूछना चाहता हूं कि ब्रेक फास्ट की मीटिंग ओवरनाइट नहीं फिक्स हुई होगी। उसकी तैयारी पहले की गई होगी everybody must have known that a breakfast meeting was going to take place. Did you expect that President Musharraf would discuss about weather with the editors? मौसम की बात करते कि कितना हसीन मौसम है, ताजमहल कितना हसीन है, कितना खूबसूरत है। यानी आप को कम से कम इतना पता होना चाहिए था कि जब मेन एडीटर्स से बात कर रहे हैं तो जाहिर है कि वे अपनी बात करेंगे। आपको इसमें दिलचस्पी लेनी चाहिए थी। आप कहते हैं कि आपको पता नहीं था कि वह बोलने वाले हैं। आपको पता ही नहीं है कि वह टेलीवाइज हो रहा है। मान लीजिए, मैं सख्त लफ्जों का इस्तेमाल नहीं करता हूं। लेकिन इस सारे कार्य के मामले में नालायकी, इनएफिसियेंसी है, यह मुझे बहुत दुख के साथ कहना पड़ रहा है क्योंकि हमें बड़ी आशायें थीं, बड़ी उम्मीदें थी।

श्री संघ प्रिय गौतम (उत्तरांचल) : यह शब्द अनपार्लियामेंटरी है, इसे देख लीजिए।

डा. कर्ण सिंह : मैंने किसी को नालायक नहीं कहा। ...**(व्यवधान)**...

श्री एस.एस. अहलुवालिया : आपकी जुबान पर यह शब्द शोभा नहीं देता।

डा. कर्ण सिंह : मैंने किसी को नालायक नहीं बोला मैडम।

उपसभापति : नालायक वर्ड अनपार्लियामेंटरी है। अगर आपको कहना है तो आप नालायक वर्ड मत यूज कीजिए। आप कहें कि वह लायक नहीं है

DR. KARAN SINGH: Madam, I am sorry, if I have hurt anybody ...(*Interruptions*)...

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Now, don't discuss the Indian dictionary. ...(*Interruptions*)...Order, please. Dr. Sahib, somebody said "you are telling a lie." This word is unparliamentary. The other person got up and said, "I am sorry, I withdraw it because I was not telling the truth...(*Interruptions*)...

DR. KARAN SINGH: Madam, if the word 'nalayaki' has hurt anybody, I withdraw it, but what I was trying to say was 'inefficiency'. That

was the word I was trying to get. So, it was not a well-handled subject, whether it was the media, whether it was the DGMO question, whether it was the Hurriyat question, whether it was the breakfast meeting question.

Now, I would come to the crux of the matter; and that is, why are we on the defensive, as far as Pakistan is concerned? I would like to raise this point. We are the aggrieved party. We say that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. सुषमा जी आप सुन रही हैं। जरा थोड़ी सा मेरी ओर ध्यान दीजिए, क्षमा करें, नाराज न हो जाइए। I am saying that the State of Jammu and Kashmir became an integral part of India when my father signed the Instrument of Accession. That is why I said, "I am part of history." That is why Jammu and Kashmir became a part of India. Now, half of the territory of that State is in adverse possesion. The whole of Gilgit and Baltistan areas have virtually been included by Pakistan into it. The PoK is under their control. A large, a considerable area, has been ceded to China. Madam, what I would like to ask is : Why are we on the defensive, when we say that Jammu and Kashmir is not the central and core issue? It is the central and core issue, in the sense that cross-border terrorism concerns Jammu and Kashmir, nuclear risk reduction concerns Jammu and Kashmir, the adverse possession of 50 per cent of the State concerns Jammu and Kashmir. Why are we fighting shy of it? Why should we not take the initiative and tell him about it? Did we raise this question? Did we ask him, what are the views of the people of Gilgit and Baltistan? Did the Prime Minister tell him, "Mr. President, when I come to Pakistan, I want to meet a delegation of people from Gilgit and Baltistan, separately, without your being there?" Did he tell him, "I want to meet a delegation of the MQM to know their views on this issue, without your being there?"

Why are we constantly on the defensive? I do not understand. We are the aggrieved party. We have been constantly under attack for the last 50 years. The 50 per cent of the State, which my father and my ancestors created and for which my father signed the Instrument of Accession, is no longer with us. And, yet, all the time we are running, as if we are the guilty. Madam, I would suggest that a much more pro-active action should be taken in this case. When we are dealing, particularly, with a person of that nature, who is very focused, very aggressive and extremely single-pointed, we have to deal in a different manner. I am not saying that you do not negotiate. Certainly, we must negotiate. We must negotiate on Jammu and Kashmir, on nuclear risk reduction measures, on Siachen, on tourism, on trade, on economics and on the whole Valley; and, if he wants

to talk about Jammu and Kashmir, we should be prepared to talk about Jammu & Kashmir. I am prepared to talk about Jammu and Kashmir. Let him have a dialogue with me on television. I am prepared to take him on. We are constantly missing the wood for the trees. We have no clear-cut ideas as to what we should do.

Madam, unless we take a clear-cut stand, unless we know what we have to do, we will not be able to solve this problem. And I am not talking of aggression. For example, some very, very provocative statements have been made. I won't mention who made the statement. Somebody said, "Let us have a full-scale war with Pakistan." He is a friend of mine; therefore, I won't mention his name. But it is not something which should be said, because we should realise that if there is a war, there can be nothing but disaster and deaths; the whole civilisational development of 5000 years on the sub-continent will be destroyed. We must realise the stakes involved. Therefore, we must be prepared to talk. But we should not allow this gentleman to have his way. He is an impressive man. We met him at the parties. We saw him on television. I was very impressed. We have a military General here also. I was very impressed that a General was able to come across like that. He is a man of war. From his point of view, he did a very impressive job. We must also be prepared to do that. We will have to deal with him now for many years, because हमारा राजलिलक लगाया हुआ है, मुझे लगता है कि कई साल जनरल साहब राज करेंगे और इनके साथ हमें बहुत देर तक बातचीत करनी पड़ेगी। इसलिए ऐसा करें कि हम अपने ज़ेहन को क्लीयर करें।

Let us be absolutely crystal clear in our approach. Let us know what we are going to achieve. And, in any future meeting that may take place, let us be better structured; let us be better mobilised. Let Sushmaji be in charge of the media from the beginning, and not suddenly appear and disappear like in one of those dramatic serials which we see on T.V. बात चलती रहनी चाहिये। जैसे अली सरदार जाफरी ने कहा, "गुफ्तगु बंद न हो, बात से बात चले।" बात चलनी चाहिये, डट कर के बात चलनी चाहिये, निडर हो कर बात करनी चाहिये। सारे हिन्दुस्तान, भारतवर्ष के जो 100 करोड़ लोग हैं, उनकी बेहतरी भी बातचीत में है, पाकिस्तान के लोगों की बेहतरी भी बातचीत में है और सारे बर्रे सगीर के जो लोग हैं, उनकी बेहतरी भी बातचीत में है। मैं यही अल्फाज़ आपके सामने रखना चाहता हूं। धन्यवाद।

उपसभापति : डाक्टर साहब, आपने बड़ा अच्छा भाषण किया। आपने एक बात कही कि एनेलिस्ट्स को सवाल पूछने चाहियें थे। मैंने तो डायरेक्ट मुशर्रफ साहब से कहा कि मेरा काम डेमोक्रेसी का है, मैं 140 कंट्रीज़ की डेमोक्रेसी, आई.पी.यू. की चेयरमैन हूं। मैंने उनसे पूछा कि आप कब डेमोक्रेसी लाने वाले हैं। आपके फॉरेन मिनिस्टर ने वादा किया है कि 2002 तक, हमने एक चिट्ठी जेनेवा में लिखी है कि 2002 तक डेमोक्रेसी आ जाएगी। तो कम से कम हमारे छोड़ने से पहले आ जाए तो हम आपको वैलकम कर सकेंगे।

6.00 P.M.

But, before I do that, there are two important matters. One is the Statement by the Minister, Shrimati Vasundhara Raje. She is to make a statement regarding remote sensing data policy. Because we are short of time, she will lay her Statement on the Table of the House and we will find time on some other day for clarifications.

STATEMENT BY MINISTER

Remote Sensing Data Policy

THE MINISTER OF STATE OF THE MINISTRY OF SMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES AND AGRO AND RURAL INDUSTRIES, MINISTER OF STATE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL AND TRAINING, DEPARTMENT OF PENSIONS AND PENSIONERS WELFARE OF THE MINISTRY OF PERSONNEL, PUBLIC GRIEVANCES AND PENSIONS, DEPARTMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY AND DEPARTMENT OF SPACE (SHRIMATI VASUNDHARA RAJE): Madam, I beg to lay a statement regarding Remote Sensing Data Policy on the Table of the House.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Let the copies of the Statement be distributed to the Members. Let the Members have a chance to read the Statement. It is a very scientific-oriented statement. It will take some time to understand as it is a very technical issue.

श्री टी.एन. चतुर्वेदी (उत्तर प्रदेश) : इसके क्लैरीफिकेशंस ...**(व्यवधान)**...

उपसभापति : क्लैरीफिकेशंस घर से तैयार करके रखेंगे। आफ द कफ रिमार्क्स थोड़े रखेंगे There is a message from Lok Sabha. Secretary-General.

MESSAGE FROM THE LOK SABHA

The Indian Council of World Affairs Bill, 2000

SECRETARY-GENERAL: Madam, I have to report to the House the following message received from the Lok Sabha signed by the Secretary-General of the Lok Sabha:

"I am directed to inform you that Lok Sabha, at its sitting held on the 8th August, 2001, has adopted the following motion:-